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Racial Disparities in Education Finance: Going Beyond Equal Revenues 
Education has largely been seen as the most direct route out of poverty and into the middle class. 
Beginning with the Coleman report (Coleman et al. 1966), which documented the disparities in 
academic achievement across different ethnic and racial groups, there has been concern about 
understanding these disparities and closing these gaps. An obvious source of the disparity in 
academic achievement has been the variation in educational opportunities arising from 
differences in educational spending. In the past, because public schools were funded largely by 
local property taxes, property-rich and -poor school districts differed greatly in expenditures per 
pupil. Since the early 1970s, however, state legislatures have, on their own initiative or at the 
behest of state courts, implemented school finance equalization programs to reduce the disparity 
in within-state education spending.  
Nonetheless, large financial differences remain. In addition, many nonfinancial measures 
of school quality and student outcomes still differ greatly across social and economic groups. 
Schools with high concentrations of poor or minority students have a higher incidence of school 
violence, more poorly maintained physical structures, more less-experienced teachers, and fewer 
AP courses and Internet connections. Further, educational outcomes for poor and minority 
students, while improving, are still lower than those of their white counterparts.  
This paper examines the success of court-mandated solutions in equalizing spending per 
pupil across districts serving minority and white students. Other measures related to educational 
quality and educational outcomes differ substantially. The paper first describes the court rulings 
that affect the role of the property tax in education finance, examining both the initial 
equalization decisions and the more recent court decisions that call for an adequacy standard. It 
also reviews the literature on the impact of school finance reform on overall finances.  
The paper then examines changes in finances over time—both within and across states—
and evaluates how spending levels have changed for school districts that serve students of 
different races. Spending differences have largely disappeared. Spending levels across districts 
have converged; most remaining differences in spending are between rather than within states. 
Several measures of education resources other than dollars are also presented. Corcoran and 
colleagues (2004), using national datasets on school conditions, show that the disparity of 
resources across socioeconomic status and racial groups has improved only slightly.  
To close, the paper examines differences in outcomes for students of different races. 
There is limited evidence of some narrowing of test score gaps across students of different races, 
but any evaluations are limited by a lack of consistent data measuring other student outcomes 
over time across states. The lack of national measurement in part comes from the autonomy 
given to states in defining terms or setting specific targets to be met. For example, states use 
different measures of graduation rates to satisfy No Child Left Behind (NCLB) rules. New policy 
proposals attempt going beyond equalization of funds to ensuring an adequate education for all 
students irrespective of race or income status. 
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A Short History of School Finance Reform 
In the 1960s, critics began to formulate legal challenges to the system of local funding for public 
schools. They broadly agreed on the source of the problem: local control of key educational 
decisions had led to significant differences in education spending among districts within states. 
An early strategy argued that the educational needs of all children must be met and that meeting 
those needs might require the state to spend more on educating low-achieving, low-income 
students than on students from affluent, well-educated families. The courts were unsympathetic 
to this line of argument, concluding that a “needs-based” theory left too many questions 
unanswered. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court wrote in Burris v. Wilkerson, “The courts 
have neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the power to tailor the public monies to fit the 
varying needs of the students throughout the State.”  
An argument that proved successful in state courts was that poor school districts had little 
property wealth that they could tax (Coons, Clune, and Sugarman 1970; Minorini and Sugarman 
1999). The 1971 Serrano v. Priest case in California was the first using the Coons and colleagues 
principle to be decided for the plaintiffs when the California State Supreme Court declared the 
state school funding program unconstitutional. The basis of this ruling became known as the 
“fiscal neutrality” standard. In 1973, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
the United States Supreme Court rejected an attempt to establish a similar standard. Following 
this ruling, school finance reforms were pursued state by state: some states were forced to reform 
school finances as a result of litigation, while others voluntarily passed legislation equalizing 
state aid formulas. While almost all these reforms involved redistributing funds between districts, 
some states simply decided to increase the level of funding for all.  
These efforts have increased the state’s role in education finance. Murray, Evans, and 
Schwab (1998) consider the effect of court-mandated school finance reform on the level and 
distribution of per pupil spending in the United States between 1970 and 1990. They find that 
court-mandated reform decreased within-state inequality significantly by raising spending at the 
bottom of the distribution while leaving spending at the top unchanged. Court-mandated finance 
reform generally leads states to increase spending for education, financed by higher state taxes. 
(There are some notable exceptions to this statement, namely California, which seems to have 
leveled down education spending in part because of the interaction between the Serrano decision 
and Proposition 13, the voter initiative to limit property taxes that was passed in 1978.) 
Since the 1990s, many of the challenges to state finance systems have focused on 
ensuring that all students have equitable access to adequate educational opportunities as required 
by state education clauses (Minorini and Sugarman 1999). The argument is that some districts do 
not provide students with an adequate education and that it is the state’s responsibility to see that 
districts receive the funding to enable them to do so. The remedy might require some districts to 
spend more (perhaps significantly more) than other districts, depending on their student 
population. For example, in districts with many students from low-income families and families 
where English is not the first language, an “adequate education” may cost more money, and the 
state is required to ensure that these needs are met. These new adequacy cases are a rebirth of the 
“needs-based” claims of the late 1960s.  
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Figure 1 maps the states with early and late court decisions. “Early court” states reformed 
their education funding based on the fiscal neutrality standards of the 1970s. “Late court” states 
reformed their financing often based on the 1990s’ adequacy claims. 
 
An adequacy claim would emphasize outcomes more than a wealth-neutrality or 
spending-equalization claim would. But there is a second important strand to this emerging 
adequacy stance. Adequacy typically emphasizes absolute standards of performance, while past 
equity debates focused on comparisons among children and districts and how well they fared 
relative to each other in money and inputs. Adequacy claims also involves setting an absolute 
standard rather than defining equity in terms of the relative spending across systems. Adequacy 
demands are also reminiscent of federal policy, whereby NCLB sets achievement standards for 
all subclasses of students. 
Differences in District Spending Over Time 
To examine changes in spending over time, we calculate three measures of inequality in district-
level per pupil education spending by Murray and colleagues (1998) and Corcoran and 
colleagues (2004), based on data from 1972 to 1997.1 We calculate the 95/5 ratio, the coefficient 
                                                 
1 Our primary dataset is the 2002 Census of Governments School System Finance (F-33) file. The survey is 
conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau in years ending in 2 or 7 on behalf of the U.S. Department of Education’s 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The F-33 file contains revenue, expenditure, and fall enrollment 
data for all U.S. public school districts and includes 10,489 unified school districts in 46 states. Districts in Alaska; 
Washington, D.C.; Hawaii; Montana; and Vermont were dropped from the dataset. Alaska has a unique cost 
situation because of its location. Both Hawaii and Washington, D.C., are single-district systems, making within-state 
spending comparisons impossible. Only a small percentage of students in Montana and Vermont attend unified 
school districts. We calculated the unweighted value of 95th percentile and 5th percentile per pupil current 
expenditures in unified districts for each state. Districts with greater than 150 percent of 95th percentile expenditures 
or less than 50 percent of 5th percentile expenditures were deleted. In 2002, 91.2 percent of all public school 
students were enrolled in districts included in our dataset. 
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of variation, and the Theil index. Each measure increases as imbalance in the distribution of 
education expenditures rises.2 Our particular interest is to isolate state-specific disparity in 
spending from variation across the nation as a whole. We decompose the coefficient of variation 
and the Theil index into between- and within-state portions. In addition, each measure is 
calculated for individual states, as well as the nation as a whole. District expenditures are 
weighted by student enrollment to control for size differences across districts. 
Our most straightforward measure is the ratio of spending per pupil in the district that 
spends at the 95th percentile to the district that spends at the 5th percentile. The 95/5 ratio has a 
value of 1 when 95th and 5th percentile expenditures are identical.  
The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation in district expenditures as a 
percentage of the mean expenditure in a state. It has a minimum value of 0 if spending levels are 
the same within the state and increases with growing inequality. It is equally sensitive to 
transfers between districts, regardless of district differences in per pupil spending levels. 
Our final measure is the Theil index, which measures how the distribution of 
expenditures across districts in a state differs from the distribution of student enrollment. The 
index equals 0 if every district’s share of spending is equal to its share of enrollment. The Theil 
index is more sensitive to transfers between districts with greater resource-level disparity. An 
advantage of the Theil index is that the index for the United States can be decomposed to 
measure per pupil spending inequality between and within states.  
Table 1 presents these inequality measures at a national level for every fifth year from 
1972 to 2002. We focus on the trend in these measures in relation to the 2002 numbers. 
Inequality declined sharply and consistently across all measures from 1992 to 2002. In particular, 
inequality fell from 1972 to 1982, rose over the next five years, was flat over the next period, 
dipped substantially again from 1992 to 1997, and then was largely flat over the last five years of 
the sample. Both periods of decreasing inequality largely corresponded to the periods following 
court activity. Over the entire period from 1972 to 2002, inequality in the national distribution of 
education expenditures decreased significantly. The Theil index, coefficient of variation, and 
95/5 ratio fell by 32, 17, and 20 percent, respectively. 
The three subsequent sections of table 1 decompose national variation in education 
expenditures into within- and across-state components. As seen in the lower half of the table, 
between-state inequality is a much larger share of overall spending inequality than within-state 
inequality, and it has increased recently. Across all years, variation in spending across states 
accounts for roughly two-thirds of inequality at the national level. This proportion has been 
relatively constant, dropping to around one-half in 1982 but returning to two-thirds by 1987.  
The first Theil index decomposition highlights the differing trends in between- and 
within-state inequality from 1972 to 2002. From 1972 to 1982, spending between states was 
converging while within-state inequality increased. Following decisions in the first court 
equalization cases in the 1970s, within-state inequality dropped; this relationship is especially 
pronounced in states that had early equalization decisions. Within-state inequality declined 
further from 1992 to 2002. Thus, education spending inequality dropped overall after passage of 
                                                 
2 See Murray, Evans, and Schwab (1998) or Corcoran et al. (2004) for equations estimated.  
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the first court decisions, with 70 percent of existing differences in education spending coming 
from across- rather than within-state variation. Note that some differences in spending per pupil 
across (and within) states can reflect cost of living differences, so it is not necessarily desirable 
to equalize spending per pupil across all states. However, much of the decline in between-state 
inequality has resulted from higher growth rates in per pupil spending by the lowest spending 
states in 1972. 
Table 1. Measures of Inequality in Per Pupil Spending Levels 
  1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 
Measures of inequality        
95/5 ratio 2.72 2.37 2.22 2.53 2.40 2.10 2.18 
Coefficient of variation 30.8 28.1 25.6 29.6 29.9 26.0 25.7 
Theil index (x 1,000) 43.7 37.1 31.0 40.7 40.5 30.6 29.7 
        
Theil index decomposition        
Within states 13.7 14.4 14.0 12.6 13.4 9.9 8.7 
Between states 30.0 22.8 17.0 28.2 27.1 20.7 21.0 
National 43.7 37.1 31.0 40.7 40.5 30.6 29.7 
        
Theil index decomposition (%)        
Within states 31.4 38.8 45.2 31.0 33.1 32.4 29.3 
Between states 68.6 61.5 54.8 69.3 66.9 67.6 70.7 
National 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
        
Variance decomposition (%)        
Within states 32.2 41.5 47.5 32.8 35.3  30.6 
Between states 67.8 58.5 52.5 67.2 64.7  69.4 
National 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0   100.0 
Source (2002 Stats): 2002 Census of Governments: School System Finance (F-33) File (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Department of Commerce). 
Notes: Calculated from per pupil current operating expenditures by unified school districts. Excludes data from 
Alaska, DC, Hawaii, Montana, and Vermont. Each state’s unweighted value of 95th percentile and 5th percentile of 
per pupil expenditure was calculated.  
District Spending by Racial Groups 
We have not thus far examined the difference in spending levels across students of different 
races. To examine spending patterns across different populations of students, we compared 
average per pupil spending across districts weighted by the number of students in each racial or 
ethnic group. In general, differences in spending per pupil in districts serving nonwhite and white 
students are very small. In 1972, the ratio of nonwhite to white spending was .98; this trend had 
reversed by 1982, as spending per pupil for nonwhite students was slightly higher than for white 
students in most states and in the United States as a whole and has been for the past 20 years 
(figure 2). Table 2 presents spending per pupil figures for 2002 weighted by the number of 
students in each subgroup. 
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Table 2. 2002 Average District Spending Per Pupil, Weighted by Subgroup Population 
State  White 
Non-
white Black Hispanic Asian/P.I. 
Native 
American 
Black: 
white 
spending 
ratio 
Non-
white: 
white 
spending 
ratio 
Alabama 6,050 6,220 6,225 6,147 6,326 6,037 1.03 1.03 
Alaska 8,453 11,320 8,074 8,341 8,532 12,991 0.96 1.34 
Arizona 5,249 5,680 5,341 5,397 5,240 6,823 1.02 1.08 
Arkansas 5,850 6,411 6,511 5,957 6,193 5,946 1.11 1.10 
California 6,936 7,156 7,304 7,120 7,160 7,371 1.05 1.03 
Colorado 6,811 6,820 6,883 6,800 6,873 6,777 1.01 1.00 
Connecticut 9,834 11,089 11,214 11,182 10,202 9,864 1.14 1.13 
Delaware 9,075 9,265 9,239 9,338 9,408 9,114 1.02 1.02 
DC 13,330 13,330 13,330 13,330 13,330 13,330 1.00 1.00 
Florida 5,970 6,151 6,082 6,252 5,999 6,027 1.02 1.03 
Georgia 6,930 7,563 7,625 7,274 7,274 7,092 1.10 1.09 
Hawaii 7,306 7,306 7,306 7,306 7,306 7,306 1.00 1.00 
Idaho 5,945 5,995 6,001 5,870 6,066 6,990 1.01 1.01 
Illinois 6,919 7,512 7,571 7,425 7,561 7,204 1.09 1.09 
Indiana 7,166 8,212 8,427 7,820 7,372 7,411 1.18 1.15 
Iowa 6,821 7,115 7,246 7,039 7,037 6,934 1.06 1.04 
Kansas 6,950 7,115 7,249 7,041 6,982 6,973 1.04 1.02 
Kentucky 6,233 6,986 7,073 6,526 6,657 6,226 1.13 1.12 
Louisiana 6,426 6,608 6,614 6,572 6,586 6,348 1.03 1.03 
Maine 8,256 8,642 8,720 8,489 8,769 8,327 1.06 1.05 
Maryland 8,278 8,644 8,539 9,022 9,078 8,374 1.03 1.04 
Massachusetts 9,535 11,649 12,201 11,453 11,167 10,322 1.28 1.22 
Michigan 7,685 8,868 9,065 8,299 8,503 7,949 1.18 1.15 
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Minnesota 7,148 8,761 9,189 8,188 8,658 8,641 1.29 1.23 
Mississippi 5,169 5,565 5,572 5,267 5,508 5,229 1.08 1.08 
Missouri 6,450 7,902 8,056 7,102 7,355 6,516 1.25 1.23 
Montana 7,463 8,737 7,350 6,975 6,794 9,729 0.98 1.17 
Nebraska 7,130 6,938 6,908 6,739 6,936 8,148 0.97 0.97 
Nevada 6,163 5,948 5,842 5,957 5,912 6,556 0.95 0.97 
New Hampshire 7,841 7,333 7,478 7,040 7,618 7,587 0.95 0.94 
New Jersey 10,652 12,678 13,226 12,651 11,175 12,106 1.24 1.19 
New Mexico 6,525 6,733 6,219 6,650 6,309 7,252 0.95 1.03 
New York 11,503 12,000 12,016 11,991 12,008 11,588 1.04 1.04 
North Carolina 6,428 6,546 6,571 6,455 6,606 6,256 1.02 1.02 
North Dakota 6,302 7,220 6,366 6,198 6,346 7,604 1.01 1.15 
Ohio 7,282 8,922 9,074 8,165 8,176 7,822 1.25 1.23 
Oklahoma 5,955 6,200 6,243 6,254 5,841 6,182 1.05 1.04 
Oregon 7,111 7,275 7,661 7,190 7,168 7,427 1.08 1.02 
Pennsylvania 7,882 7,869 7,965 7,399 8,255 7,867 1.01 1.00 
Rhode Island 9,361 9,709 9,714 9,735 9,547 9,881 1.04 1.04 
South Carolina 6,742 7,064 7,085 6,846 6,787 6,698 1.05 1.05 
South Dakota 6,133 7,130 6,047 6,043 5,980 7,559 0.99 1.16 
Texas 6,421 6,560 6,526 6,590 6,297 6,413 1.02 1.02 
Utah 4,851 5,103 4,995 5,024 4,904 6,045 1.03 1.05 
Vermont 8,983 9,467 9,531 9,220 9,593 8,796 1.06 1.05 
Virginia 7,343 7,771 7,466 8,704 8,511 7,525 1.02 1.06 
Washington 6,812 7,104 7,250 6,983 7,057 7,446 1.06 1.04 
West Virginia 7,621 7,626 7,651 7,466 7,560 7,556 1.00 1.00 
Wisconsin 8,384 9,177 9,434 8,948 8,877 8,863 1.13 1.09 
Wyoming 8,554 8,982 7,934 8,360 8,295 11,518 0.93 1.05 
         
United States 7,354 7,757 7,921 7,531 8,011 7,577 1.08 1.05 
Source (2002 Stats): 2002 Census of Governments: School System Finance (F-33) File (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Department of Commerce). 
Note: Calculated from per pupil current operating expenditures by unified school districts weighted by subgroup 
population in district.  
Limitations in District-Level Spending Analysis 
The results presented thus far need to be considered with a few caveats. These ratios do not 
reflect that the costs of educating students of different groups differ and that minority students 
are often found in urban districts that have higher cost structures. Part of the movement to an 
adequacy standard in court cases reflects the understanding that equalizing educational 
attainment or outcomes depends on factors other than money, and it may cost more to reach a 
given standard for a specific set of students or schools serving different populations.  
In addition, although spending differences have lessened between districts, it is unclear 
whether inequities are lessened at the school level. According to a recent study, the 10 largest 
school districts in California have spending gaps between high- and low-poverty high schools— 
from $64,000 to $500,000 per school (Education Trust-West 2005). This problem is not limited 
to California. A study of Baltimore, Cincinnati, and Seattle indicated district funding differences 
for high- and low-poverty schools ranging from $400,000 to $1 million (Roza and Hill 2004). 
These studies identified large disparities in school funding within districts, with schools serving 
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high-poverty students receiving substantially less district funding. These spending disparities can 
undermine existing systems trying to close achievement gaps if it means the most at-risk students 
are not receiving their fair share of highly qualified teachers. 
A significant part of the disparities found in spending and staffing across districts is 
related to staffing rules and the right to transfer and fill jobs districtwide based on seniority or 
tenure within a district. Districts often allocate a certain number of staff to a school, rather than 
giving schools a per student amount for staff compensation. As teachers gain experience, they 
often take advantage of seniority rules to move to more affluent schools where students are 
perceived as easier to teach (Roza and Hill 2004). This can lead to more experienced teachers 
clustering at low-poverty schools with vacancies at schools serving underserved populations 
filled by new teachers. As a result, new teachers (who have much lower salaries than 
experienced teachers) work disproportionately in schools in the poorest neighborhoods. Because 
of the large range in staff pay, schools with the highest needs within a district often receive 
substantially less funding because they employ the least experienced teachers.  
Betts, Rueben, and Danenberg (2000) find that although spending per pupil is largely 
equalized across districts in California, resources (including experience and qualification levels 
of teachers) vary dramatically across schools serving high- and low-income (and white and 
nonwhite) students. Schools serving low-income students typically have a larger percentage of 
inexperienced and noncredentialed teachers, and the variation in teacher qualifications is greater 
in large urban districts than in the state as a whole. Given that teacher salaries make up about 40 
percent of a school district’s budget,3 this difference in experience levels translates into large 
differences in money spent at the school rather than the district level.  
Education Quality Beyond Spending  
To examine these differences in inputs, in this section we present several non-financial measures 
of education resources taken from Corcoran et al., 2004.   Specifically, we report five different 
measures of the school environment from several nationally representative surveys: school 
safety, quality of physical capital, teacher quality, advanced placement courses, and computer 
use. In many cases, we have information over time, but in some cases, we only have information 
at a single point in time. 
In table 3, we show the fraction of schools reporting serious violent incidents and the 
number of these violent incidents per 1,000 students. The data are drawn from the National 
Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) Principal/School Disciplinarian Survey on School 
Violence, and the table reports data from the 1996/97 school year. Schools with the largest 
fraction of minority students are two and a half times more likely to report a violent incident and 
have five times the incidence rate as schools with the lowest fraction of minority students.  
                                                 
3 The 40 percent accounts only for teacher direct salaries (excluding benefits); total teacher compensation or all 
employee salaries make up a much larger percentage of school district budgets. 
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Table 3. Reported Incidents of Serious Violent Criminal Incidents in Public Schools,  
1996–97 
 % of schools 
reporting serious 
violent incidents 
Incidents 
per 1,000 
students 
By minority enrollment of school:   
< 5% 5.8 0.2 
5–19% 10.9 0.4 
20–49% 11.1 0.5 
> 50% 14.7 1.0 
By percentage of students participating in 
the free or reduced-price lunch program: 
  
< 20% 8.6 0.3 
21–34% 11.7 0.6 
35–49% 11.6 0.5 
50–75% 8.9 0.7 
> 75% 10.2 0.8 
Source: Corcoran et al. (2004). 
Note: Serious violent crimes include murder, rape or other type of sexual battery, suicide, physical attack or fight 
with a weapon, or robbery. 
In table 4, we report selected quality characteristics of school facilities (overcrowding, 
age and adequacy of the physical structure) by the school’s poverty status (as defined by the 
percentage of students eligible for the free or reduced-price lunch program in 1999). The data are 
from NCES’s Fast Response survey “Condition of Public School Facilities.” As table 4 shows, in 
the highest poverty schools—those where more than 70 percent of the students are eligible for 
the free and reduced-price lunch program—overcrowding is particularly severe. Twelve percent 
of these schools reported being more than 25 percent over capacity, compared with 8 percent of 
low-poverty schools. Similarly, 21 percent of the highest poverty schools were located in 
buildings more than 35 years old compared with 15 percent of low-poverty schools. Principals in 
high-poverty schools were far more likely to report problems with the roof, plumbing, or 
heating/AC system than were principals in low-poverty schools. Thus, the schools in the highest 
poverty setting tend to have the worst physical capital.  
Table 4. Characteristics of Capital Quality of Public Schools, 1999 
Percentage of students eligible for the free or reduced-price 
lunch program 
 < 20% 20–39% 40–69% > 70% 
Percentage of schools that are     
6–25% over capacity 16 13 16 12 
> 25% over capacity 6 8 7 12 
> 35 years old 11 15 11 21 
Percentage that have less than 
adequate 
    
 Roofs 18 21 22 32 
 Plumbing 23 23 23 32 
 Heating, ventilation/AC 28 26 29 35 
Source: Corcoran et al. (2004). 
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Research is beginning to uncover some of the factors associated with teaching quality, 
including teacher experience, academic ability, and subject matter expertise. At the same time, 
we are also learning about the maldistribution of teachers across districts, schools, and 
classrooms within schools (Betts et al. 2000; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2005). At each level, 
students with the greatest need—typically minority and low-income students—are much more 
likely to have the least effective teachers. The uneven distribution of quality teachers, and the 
strong findings about the importance of quality teachers, especially for disadvantaged students, is 
creating pressure for new policies focused on the recruitment, retention, and assignment of 
teachers.4  
Table 5 looks at a cross-section of schools from the 1993–94 Schools and Staffing Survey 
(SASS) to see how the characteristics of newly hired teachers differ across schools. SASS is a 
periodic survey conducted by the NCES that collects data from a nationally representative 
sample of public and private schools on characteristics and views of school personnel. Looking 
at new teachers, defined as those with two or fewer years of experience, table 5 shows that while 
average base-year salaries vary little between schools with different concentrations of minority 
students, the qualifications and job satisfaction of new teachers across these schools varies 
greatly. For example, in 1993–94, new teachers in schools where 90 percent or more of the 
students were minority were less likely to be certified in their primary teaching field than new 
teachers in schools that had 10 percent or fewer minority students. Teachers in primarily 
minority schools were more than five times as likely as teachers in primarily white schools to 
state that they “definitely plan to leave teaching as soon as possible” when asked how long they 
expected to teach. Differences in the qualifications of new teachers are even more striking when 
comparing across schools with different proportions of students in poverty.  
Table 5. Characteristics of Newly Hired Teachers by Race of School, from Schools and 
Staffing Survey 1993–94 
Percent of school enrollment that is black: All 0–10% 10–50% 50–90% 90+% 
Sample size 3,643 2,656 696 181 110 
Average years of experience 1.48 1.48 1.49 1.49 1.51 
Percent certified in primary teaching field 91.4 93.8 88.8 87.3 86.8 
Percent with bachelor’s degree or higher 99.5 99.4 99.7 99.8 99.7 
Percent with master’s degree or higher 16.7 15.6 15.1 26.2 28.4 
Percent teaching full-time 86.0 83.6 88.1 94.7 94.2 
Percent who say they would teach again 77.3 81.3 73.1 66.3 60.7 
Percent who plan to exit teaching as soon as possible 2.5 1.6 2.2 8.2 9.1 
Percent who plan to exit teaching at first opportunity 14.3 13.1 12.9 27.2 21.7 
Average academic base-year salary ($) 23,083 22,741 23,509 23,943 24,209 
Source: Corcoran et al. (2004). 
Note: “Newly hired teachers” are teachers with two or fewer years of experience. 
Table 6 uses three large NCES longitudinal surveys to examine the availability of 
advanced placement (AP) courses. The datasets are the National Longitudinal Survey of 1972, 
High School and Beyond Senior Class of 1982 and the National Educational Longitudinal 
                                                 
4 There are also counter-pressures, for example, from vocal middle-class parents for particular teachers for their 
children and from experienced teachers who threaten to leave if they do not receive their preferred teaching 
assignments. 
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Survey. The entries in table 6 represent the fraction of schools that offer one or more advanced 
placement courses. While all schools made significant gains in AP offerings, schools with 
majority-black and majority-disadvantaged student populations were much less likely to offer 
these courses than largely nonblack or nonpoor schools. For example, in 1972, students in 
schools where at least 90 percent of the students are black were 30 percent less likely to have the 
opportunity to take AP courses than students in schools where less than 10 percent of the 
students were black. By 1992, however, these schools had made large strides in course offerings, 
and black students were about as likely to have AP courses offered at their schools as were white 
students. Stark differences remained between rich and poor schools in 1992, however. As table 6 
shows, 39 percent of the schools where at least 90 percent of the students were eligible for free 
or reduced-price lunch offered AP courses; in contrast, 84 percent of the schools where no more 
than 10 percent of the students were poor offered such classes. 
Table 6. Fraction of Schools Offering Advanced Placement Courses by Race and Income 
Composition of School 
High School Class of 
Category 1972 1982 1992 
    
All schools 31.0 48.3 76.4 
    
By percentage black:    
0–10% 30.0 45.6 72.8 
10–50% 36.0 57.6 84.0 
50–90% 23.9 50.0 77.9 
90–100% 21.4 41.9 76.7 
    
By percentage qualified for 
free or reduced-price lunch: 
   
0–10% 38.9 52.0 84.2 
10–50% 20.6 46.0 74.2 
50–90% 8.3 34.4 69.0 
90–100% 0.0 26.7 38.5 
Source: Corcoran et al. (2004). 
In table 7, we report the fraction of schools and classrooms with Internet access. As 
shown in the first row of that table, although only 33 percent of schools had access to the Internet 
in 1994, 98 percent has access by 2000. Given the high fraction of schools with Internet access, it 
should come as no surprise that there is little variation in Internet access across schools with 
different characteristics. For example, schools with a high fraction of minority students or a high 
fraction of students receiving free or reduced-price lunch still had Internet access rates above 94 
percent. 
In the bottom half of table 7 we report the fraction of classrooms wired for the Internet. 
The fraction of classrooms with Internet access has increased dramatically in all schools. In 
schools where more than 50 percent of students were minority, the fraction of wired classrooms 
increased to 64 percent in 2000. However, this number is 21 percentage points below the rate for 
classrooms with less than 6 percent minority students. This disparity only touches on the digital 
divide by race: NCES indicates a number of other quality differences between schools with 
different socioeconomic characteristics, including differences in the speed of the connection, 
training of the teachers, and the number of computers. 
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Table 7. Percentage of Schools and Classrooms with Internet Access, 1994–2000 
  
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
  Percent of Schools 
All schools 35 50 65 78 89 95 98 
By percentage minority enrollment:        
(1) < 6% 38 52 65 84 91 95 98 
(2) 6–20% 38 58 72 87 93 97 100 
(3) 21–49% 38 55 65 73 91 96 98 
(4) > 50% 27 39 56 63 82 92 96 
 Difference (1) - (4) 11 13 9 21 9 3 2 
  Percent of Classrooms 
All classrooms 3 8 14 27 51 64 77 
By percentage minority enrollment:        
(1) < 6% 4 9 18 37 57 74 85 
(2) 6–20% 4 10 18 35 59 78 83 
(3) 21–49% 4 9 12 22 52 64 79 
(4) > 50% 2 3 5 13 37 43 64 
         
 Difference (1) - (4) 2 6 13 24 20 31 21 
Source: Corcoran et al. (2004).  
The NCES data provide information on the availability of computers in schools; they do 
not, however, tell us anything about actual usage. Fortunately, data on computer use has been 
collected in the October School Enrollment supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS). 
The CPS is a monthly survey of approximately 50,000 households conducted by the Census 
Bureau. Its primary purpose is to collect information on the size and characteristics of the labor 
force. Each October, the CPS administers the school enrollment supplement that collects 
educational attainment and enrollment information for both adults and children in the household. 
The 1984, 1987, 1993, and 1997 supplements also include questions about computer use at 
home, school, and work.  
The results from the CPS show that although computer use in school has increased 
considerably for all groups, significant differences remain. In 1984, computer use by white, non-
Hispanic students was 18 percentage points higher than for blacks and almost 20 percent higher 
than for Hispanics. Over the next 13 years, computer use in school by these minority groups 
more than tripled, with the difference in use rates cut in half for blacks but showing little 
progress for Hispanics.  
Does Money Matter? Do School Finance Reforms Make a Difference? 
The debate over whether the level of education spending affects outcomes is long, contentious, 
and ongoing. Hanushek (1986, 1997) summarizes the existing “education production function” 
literature by stating “there appears to be no strong or systematic relationship between school 
expenditures and student performance” (1986, 1162). However, recent work including Ladd and 
Ferguson (1996) shows that properly specified econometric models do find that additional 
resources generate better outcomes. Others have argued that measures other than test scores 
should be considered in the debate. Card and Krueger (1992a, 1992b) provide some important 
direct evidence that increases in education spending raise the rate of return to education. 
However, Betts (1995), using data from the NLSY, finds no evidence that increases in spending 
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in schools raises student future wages. Given the state of this literature, trying to untangle the 
connections between spending and outcomes is difficult.  
While evidence generally shows that school finance reforms have narrowed the spending 
discrepancies within states and, to an extent, across states (Murray et al. 1998), the evidence of 
how student outcomes have changed following these reforms is murky. Downes (1992) looks at 
the California experience following Serrano. He finds greater equality in spending was not 
accompanied by greater equality in measured student performance. Using nationwide individual 
student data, Downes and Figlio (1997) find court-mandated school-finance reforms do not 
significantly change either the mean level or the distribution of student performance on 
standardized tests. They do find, however, that legislative reforms that are not a result of a court 
decision lead to higher test scores in general; the estimated effect is particularly large in initially 
low spending districts. Hoxby (2001) finds little evidence that school finance would significantly 
affect the high school dropout rate. Finally, Card and Payne (1998) focus on the impact of 
finance reform on SAT scores. They conclude that the evidence points to a modest equalizing 
effect of school-finance reforms on the test score outcomes for children from different family 
backgrounds, though they would agree that the evidence is not decisive.  
Understanding how these changes translate into student outcomes is further complicated 
by a lack of consistent data over time on student achievement for different groups of students. 
The passage of the accountability rules for NCLB has led to information being collected across 
states (including graduation rates and student achievement measures), but these measures are 
inconsistent across states and, even within a state, change over time. Some of the best new 
research involves examining student achievement using state-specific databases where students 
can be followed over time and linked to teachers. But the magnitude of the teacher effect has 
only recently been fully understood. After examining these questions using data on Texas, 
Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005, 419) find “large differences among teachers in their impacts 
on achievement and show that high quality instruction through primary school could 
substantially offset disadvantages associated with low socioeconomic background.”  
Student Achievement by Race 
The effects of court reforms on student achievement have been mixed, but has the gap between 
white and nonwhite students been closing? Much research has documented the disparities in 
student achievement between white and black students. Differentials by race are often entangled 
with differences in other family characteristics (income, parental education) that also affect 
student achievement. Researchers have found that these gaps in achievement often predate 
attendance in school and persist into adulthood.5 As measured by the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP) test scores, there has been a narrowing in the achievement gap 
since 1970 even as overall test scores are improving for students. For example, white 4th grade 
students had an average scale score of 246 on the math test in 2005, compared with 220 for black 
students and 226 for Hispanic students. In 1990, average test scores were 220, 188, and 200 for 
white, black, and Hispanic students, respectively. Test score gaps are larger for 8th graders than 
for 4th graders, and achievement gaps seem to usually increase over time.  
                                                 
5 See, for example, Jenks and Phillips (1998) and Fryer and Levitt (2004) for a description of multiple studies.  
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In contrast to earlier studies, Fryer and Levitt (2004) find that test score gap of entering 
students can be explained by controlling for covariates including child’s age, child’s birth 
weight, socioeconomic measures, mother’s age at first birth, and number of children’s books in 
the home. They posit that differences in results may reflect real gains in recent cohorts of 
students. They do find, however, that the test score gap reappears in the first two years of school, 
especially for black students, and they don’t reject a hypothesis of the difference coming from 
lower-quality schools. It is also important to note that some variables that close the entering test 
score gap (such as books in the home) suggest that altering a child’s home environment and early 
exposure to learning may increase school achievement.  
Black and Hispanic students also have higher dropout rates than white students. It is more 
difficult to tell if this gap has been closing over time as state definitions of graduation rates have 
varied over time and across states. Figure 3 maps the ratio of four-year high school completion 
rates for black and white students in 2002. Note that information on graduation rates by racial or 
ethnic group is unavailable for some states (including California and the District of Columbia) 
that serve a large share of minority students. Thus, there seems to be some closing of the test 
score gap over time but little evidence that differences are related to changes in education 
finance.  
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications  
Differences in spending per pupil have diminished over the past 38 years in the aftermath of 
court cases, but significant variation still exists. Further, there is little evidence that these efforts 
have directly affected student achievement. There has been some closing of test score gaps 
between black and Hispanic students and white students and greater availability of AP courses. 
States are moving beyond equalization to ensure that each student receives an adequate 
education.  
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Are there programs that might help achieve the goal of equal and adequate achievement 
for all students? While there is no panacea, a number of programs or changes seem to offer 
returns and gains for minority students.  
Although the variation in district spending has decreased, spending at the district level 
does not necessarily translate into actual dollars spent in a specific classroom or school. As noted 
earlier, districts typically price teachers at an average salary rate, and salary dollars spent do not 
enter a school’s budget constraint. Thus, some schools in a district can have a more experienced 
and costly teaching force while others have newer teachers. While these disparities come about 
through seniority rules for transfers and district pricing policies, they can and often do lead to 
predominantly inexperienced teaching forces at minority, high-poverty schools. If each school 
within a district faced actual costs, then each would have to decide on what budget choices 
would work best to educate the students within the school. Indeed, partnered with funding 
mechanisms that allocate money per pupil and consider the higher costs to educate certain 
students or the specific costs of certain schools (say, additional funds for security or counselors if 
needed), these policies could lead to more equalized spending within districts and a different 
distribution of experienced teachers. 
School-based budgeting is receiving growing levels of attention as a way to mitigate 
inequities among schools. The Thomas Fordham Institute has launched the “100 percent 
solution,” which advocates for school-based budgeting using weighted student funding and has a 
group of high-profile bipartisan signatories (Thomas B. Fordham Institute 2006).  
An alternative policy would be to try to target bonus pay to high-quality teachers who are 
willing to teach in high-poverty or low-performing schools. Under this policy, we must 
determine how to measure quality (no easy task) and whether we can move beyond assuming 
experience increases teacher performance to measuring teacher quality through student test 
scores or principal assessments. Programs that earmark extra funds to attract teachers to specific 
schools also need to make sure this money is correctly targeted.  
Another policy option being considered as part of some adequacy programs is to focus 
money and effort on pre-kindergarten programs. There is some evidence of long-term gains from 
early intervention. Focusing resources on children before they enter school or during the summer 
might help close the achievement gaps still faced by students. 
There could also be a role for federal intervention if it is perceived that across-state 
differences in spending matter. However, given the limited relationship between aggregate 
spending and student achievement, it is unclear that this would help. Current achievement gains 
might be related to additional federal regulations as part of NCLB, and there might be a role for 
the federal government to better design and collect information on how students fare across the 
country. For example, federal requirements of consistent measurement of graduation rates would 
help researchers better understand if some subgroups are being left behind. Indeed, Secretary of 
Education Margaret Spellings has recently called for a uniform definition of graduation rates and 
dropouts across states and that data be available to disaggregate this information across student 
populations.  
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